Privacy and synchronisation
What leaves your machine, when it may, and what a server of ours sees of it on the way.
It asks before it connects.
The first thing Noodletail asks is whether it may open a connection at all. Choose airgapped and every outbound request is refused before it leaves - on the desktop by a filter on the whole session, on the phone and in the browser at the one door every request goes through - and the update check does not run at all. Not by convention, but in code that cannot be talked around.
You can change the answer at any time under Settings, Privacy. A missing or unreadable settings file falls back to airgapped, so a failure produces the restrictive answer rather than the convenient one.
May this application connect to the internet?
Airgapped is a filter, not a promise.
The browser is the one with an asterisk, and it is spelled out.
Everything here is written, tested, and running today. Where a tab has to go through us, the page says so, and says what passes.
Optional, and to your own account.
Files travel between your machines and your account, and on a desktop or a phone they do not pass a server of ours on the way. There is one exception, it is the browser, and it is below rather than in a footnote.
- A real three-way merge
- Edits made in different places on two machines are combined, using the last state both sides agreed on. A page renamed here and edited there ends up renamed and edited.
- No conflict markers
-
Your version is left exactly as it is and the other one arrives
beside it as a copy. A page is never handed back to you with
<<<<<<<in it. - Nothing is unlinked
- A file a synchronisation deletes goes to the trash, and nothing is overwritten without a copy kept for a week.
A tab cannot reach storage itself, so we carry the bytes for it. We keep none of them.
Two reasons, and neither is fixable in the application. There is nowhere in a browser tab to keep a storage credential that a script injected into the page could not also read. And storage will not answer a browser from another origin at all unless it has been configured to.
So when you synchronise from a tab, it asks us to read and write the files and we do it on its behalf. They are proxied and answered; nothing is stored here and what is left behind is a line in an access log with no path in it. The desktop and the phone are untouched by this and still go straight to storage.
The browser never names a file we could get wrong. It names a workspace and a path inside it, and the actual key is composed here from the account that signed in, so a tab that had been taken over entirely still could not ask for anybody else's notes.
- What it sees
- A browser user's files, while they are moving, and the paths inside that one workspace.
- What it keeps
- Nothing. Each request is performed and answered; none of it is written down here.
- Who this is not about
- The desktop and the phone. Their files go straight to storage and never through here. All this reads of theirs is a workspace's name, when a browser asks which workspaces the account holds, and file sizes, to say how full it is.
Connecting to GitHub goes past our sign-in once, to fetch the token. We do not keep it.
GitHub will only hand out a token to someone holding a client
secret, and a desktop application cannot keep a secret: anything
shipped inside it can be read out of it. So your browser passes
auth.noodletail.com on its way to
GitHub's own consent screen, and that server makes the one
exchange the application is not allowed to make itself.
It holds the token for seconds, hands it to your machine and deletes it. There is no account there, no database and no log of it, and it is never involved again: a workspace that is already connected keeps working with that server switched off entirely.
Dropbox does not pass it at all, because Dropbox does not require a secret. And you can skip the whole thing for GitHub too, by pasting a fine-grained token scoped to one repository. Either way the token lands in your operating system keychain, and is never shown, never pasted and never handled by the interface.
- What it sees
- One authorization code and one token, for a few seconds.
- What it keeps
- Nothing for long. One encrypted entry, deleted the moment your machine collects it; one that is never collected stops working after ten minutes and is erased within twenty.
- What it never sees
- Your pages, your attachments, your repository, your password. Files never travel through it.